Introduction
While previous eras of human history may have been influenced by a variety of moral philosophies, utilitarianism has dominated the modern world. However, as with any ethical theory, those principles ought to be challenged and reconstructed in order to assess their coherence. In this paper, I will be reconstructing what seems to be the most plausible version of utilitarianism, namely classical qualitative utilitarianism. I will then critique this ethical theory by arguing that it is self-defeating, as the principle of utility directly contradicts classical qualitative utilitarianism. Finally, a possible response by the adherents to classical qualitative utilitarianism will be presented and critiqued once more.
Reconstruction of classical qualitative utilitarianism
The foundation of classical utilitarianism broadly is the principle of utility, which states that the right action is the one that maximizes pleasure while minimizing pain in the world. This principle is derived from the recognition that there must be some common principle from which an act can be assessed as “right” or “wrong,” lest there be an inescapable infinite regress of justifications. The principle of utility is determined to be this fundamental principle because it, according to utilitarians, is the only one that is self-evident and requires no external justification. To prove this, philosophers like Jeremy Bentham first outline a description of human psychology known as “psychological egoism,” which claims that every action is undertaken because it maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain, and that there is no way to escape this reality. According to Bentham, even the motivations for objective moralists and religious ascetics can be simplified to the maximization of pleasure, specifically the pleasure of honor or divine reward respectively. Bentham concludes, then, that any other purported motivations for any given act should be considered superficial.
From this description of psychological egoism, Bentham then makes a prescriptive claim through what is known as ethical hedonism. Ethical hedonism is the idea that what ought to be pursued is pleasure and what ought to be avoided is pain. Underlying this transition from description to prescription is the understanding of pleasure and pain in the context of the metaphysical “good.” Bentham argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain is the only intrinsic evil because pleasure and pain are the only things worth pursuing and avoiding for their own sake. The “good,” then, is defined as utility, namely the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain. Classical utilitarianism as a philosophy incorporates these claims.
The specific form of classical utilitarianism that I argue is more plausible, however, is classical qualitative utilitarianism. The primary difference between qualitative utilitarianism and quantitative utilitarianism is that the former conceives of pleasure as heterogenous and the latter as homogeneous. A homogenous view of pleasure is that all forms of pleasure are fundamentally of the same type and only differ in “quantity.” These quantitative differences include but are not limited to intensity, duration, scope, etc. Thus, according to the quantitative utilitarian, the pleasure of playing a game like checkers is essentially of the same type as the pleasure of listening to a Mozart concerto or reading a Dostoevsky novel. Conversely, Mill posits a heterogenous conception of pleasure, which states that bodily pleasures and intellectual pleasures are qualitatively different, and that the latter is a “higher” pleasure than the former. Thus, according to Mill, no amount of bodily pleasure can outweigh any amount of intellectual pleasure, meaning one would never be justified in choosing to maximize bodily pleasures over intellectual pleasures. The reason why classical qualitative utilitarianism seems more plausible than quantitative utilitarianism is that intellectual pleasures are entirely different in impact than bodily pleasures. Intellectual pleasure is not a ubiquitous or mundane pleasure; rather, it’s uniqueness renders it sublime and reminds one of his incredibly complex rational capacity. On the other hand, bodily pleasures are purely carnal and are thereby common to most animals. Thus, the experience of a solely bodily pleasure reduces one to his animalistic instincts, whereas intellectual pleasures remind him of his unique faculty of reason. While the animalistic reduction of bodily pleasures is still good under a hedonic perspective because it produces pleasure, it seems illogical to select a pleasure that undermines man’s uniqueness over one that emphasizes it. Thus, classical qualitative utilitarianism seems to be the most plausible form of utilitarian ethics.
The self-contradictory nature of utilitarianism
I argue that classical qualitative utilitarianism is, however, self-defeating because it cannot coexist with the principle of utility. One may consider a dilemma: either (1) the principle of utility is false, or (2) the principle of utility is true. If the first case is true, it is clear that utilitarianism as a whole is incoherent. In the second case, however, I argue that classical qualitative utilitarianism is still false. There are two different categories of pleasure that are put forth: bodily and intellectual pleasure. However, I propose a third form of pleasure: moral pleasure, or the pleasure derived from becoming the best version of oneself according to some standard of virtue. Let it be noted that this virtue need not be actually intrinsically “good,” especially since my argument is currently presupposing the notion that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Rather, these standards of virtue can be understood as solely instrumental goods, but only intrinsic goods in the mind of the actor. For example, even if never lying is not actually an intrinsic good according to utilitarianism, acting on the belief that the virtue of honesty is intrinsically good produces a specific type of moral pleasure. This pleasure is not the same as bodily pleasure, for the resulting elation is not entirely sensory. It is also not purely intellectual, for the pleasure is not found in the rational thought of virtue but specifically in the practice of that virtue. Thus, moral pleasure seems to be a pleasure of the will wherein one feels pleasure because he believes that he knows the objective good and actually acts on it. Furthermore, I argue that moral pleasure is greater than intellectual pleasure because it is a unique experience to the person undergoing the pleasure. As mentioned previously, intellectual pleasures are greater than bodily pleasures because they remind man of his unique capacity to rationalize. Likewise, moral pleasures are greater than intellectual pleasures because they require the use of this unique intellect and they remind man of his capacity to actualize what he rationalizes as the “good.” A man who could indefinitely intellectualize about his beliefs regarding the “good” but cannot consciously choose to live a good life is deprived of a unique pleasure that flows from having the courage to apply his thoughts to the real world.
When this additional factor of moral pleasure is accounted for, it becomes clear that the principle of utility actually prescribes one to follow individual virtue. If moral pleasure is the highest pleasure, one must maximize it, meaning the “right” acts are the ones which cultivate virtue in the individual and in broader society. Through this reasoning, one may argue that the principle of utility does not lead to classical utilitarianism, but to a quasi-form of virtue ethics, which is the moral philosophy that the “right” action is the one that cultivates virtue in the individual. Thus, I will refer to this new application of the principle of utility as “virtue utilitarianism” for the remainder of this paper. There are still differences between adherents to the principle of utility and those of virtue ethics, such as their differing views on whether virtue is metaphysically an intrinsic good or if it is useful to simply believe that it is. Regardless, the modern classical utilitarian approach to ethics with its general disregard for personal virtue is certainly precluded.
Responses to potential objections
The most obvious utilitarian objection that one may predict is that the entirety of virtue utilitarianism is founded on a fiction, namely that virtue is an intrinsic good. If one continues to operate under the principle of utility in order to show its incompatibility with classical utilitarianism, he must cede that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. And yet, by virtue of this exact assumption, any consideration of the morality of believing a fiction is rendered moot. If pleasure is the only intrinsic good, it should not matter whether one achieves that pleasure by accepting a noble lie. In other words, the only way for one to condemn the virtue utilitarian’s approval of believing a fiction is to accept that lying is an intrinsic evil, which would render the principle of utility and classical utilitarianism false.
A final, more compelling objection, however, is that moral pleasure is not nearly as universal as intellectual and bodily pleasure, meaning it cannot be factored into a utilitarian calculus if one seeks to maximize pleasure for the whole party concerned. While every person with a functioning body and intellect feels bodily pleasure and is capable of feeling intellectual pleasure, moral pleasure seems to be exclusive to those who believe virtue is an intrinsic good. If they do not believe this notion, then they cannot derive moral pleasure by definition. Thus, the classical utilitarian might argue, one cannot consider the maximization of moral pleasure when seeking to maximize utility because he cannot be certain who actually experiences moral pleasure. However, this objection errs insofar as the presupposed application of the principle of utility is far too limited in scope. According to the principle of utility, classical utilitarians will aim to maximize pleasure for as many people as possible. However, if the party concerned is humanity as a whole, the utilitarian ought to consider the maximization of pleasure for generations far into the future. If moral pleasure is the highest pleasure, the only state of society in which maximum pleasure is achieved is the one where all people derive maximal moral pleasure. In other words, the right action is the one which brings about a world in which everyone desires virtue as an intrinsic good. In order to achieve that end, one must cultivate a desire for virtue and help others to do the same. Even one act that jeopardizes individual virtue, then, corrupts one’s own will and sets a dangerous precedent for others to act in the same way. And if this is extrapolated to future circumstances and future generations who could replicate the set precedent, acting in an unvirtuous manner actually deprives humanity of pleasure, even if the opposite is true in the short-term. Thus, even if not every individual involved in a particular circumstance experiences moral pleasure, one ought to only consider the pursuit of virtue in order to maximize moral pleasure for humanity as a whole. Therefore, classical utilitarianism is still not entirely compatible with the principle of utility.
Conclusion
While the principle of utility has influenced much of the modern world, it seems that classical utilitarianism is actually not the most faithful application of the principle. Thus, classical utilitarianism ought to be considered self-defeating.