The Highest Good: A Metaphysics of Beauty as Experience of Truth

Introduction

Out of all the transcendentals which philosophy has identified, Beauty remains one of the most mysterious. Despite the fact that every individual has experienced the phenomena of beauty, a metaphysical analysis of beauty is mired with obscurities, further cementing its inscrutability. I believe that these difficulties can be overcome and that the mystery can be unveiled, but that this can only be done through a comprehensive reevaluation of the definition, structure, essence, and importance of beauty. First, I will attempt to expose the flaws in philosophical conceptions of beauty thus far and instead posit a novel definition. Then, I will explicate the metaphysical structure of beauty in its relation to truth, followed by a discussion on the nature of beauty and the debate on the illusory objective-subjective divide. Finally, I will outline the importance of this shift in perspective regarding beauty and the implications it has on existential, philosophical, and pedagogical beliefs and approaches.

Problems with traditional definitions of beauty

The definitions of beauty provided by philosophers have traditionally centered on beauty as “harmony” or “unity.” Aristotle, building off of Plato’s Theory of Forms, defines beauty as a property existent within objects: “The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree.”^[1]Aristotle, Metaphysics, 107^a 36; Translated by David Ross This conception of beauty as harmony is central to the modern Western philosophy of beauty. Alfred North Whitehead, for example, continues this tradition with a similar definition: “Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience… In other words, the perfection of Beauty is defined as being the perfection of Harmony…”^[2]Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 252 In fact, this idea is so foundational that it has also influenced detractors from the classical philosophical tradition, such as David Hume. Hume contends that beauty is not an objective feature of reality, but is subjective to the observer: “Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty…”^[3]David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in English Essays, from Sir Philip Sidney to Macaulay, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14), par. 7 Although Hume views beauty as a subjective mental concept, he still treats it as something which is “perceived,” albeit in a subjective manner. In this sense, he retains an aspect of the classical definition of beauty: that beauty is, fundamentally, ontological in nature. The only difference between the objectivist and the subjectivist regarding beauty is that the former describes beauty as an ontological concept to be observed and the latter describes it as an ontological concept to be constructed. In other words, both sides seem to treat beauty as an ontological “object” or “feature” of reality, the disagreement is just whether this feature exists objectively within the external world or forms subjectively within the mind.  The notion of beauty being ontological, however, seems to be the root of confusion regarding its nature. The fact that beauty can never be ascertained outside of individual experience renders its “ontological” status suspect. Other transcendental concepts like Goodness or Truth can be identified or constructed in an object regardless of whether the subject experiences the goodness or truthfulness of the object. For example, the moral realist may identify “goodness” as a property of self-sacrifice, even if he does not always experience it as good. Likewise, the moral relativist may construct the notion that self-sacrifice is good for his culture, even if he does not always experience it as good. Thus, these transcendental concepts seem to be ontological in nature given that they can be ascertained in reality by the intellect alone. On the other hand, Beauty as a transcendental behaves in an entirely different way. One cannot identify or construct beauty in an object without experiencing the object as beautiful. If a philosopher were to argue that a painting is beautiful due to its objective harmony or his subjective affinities while not personally experiencing the painting as beautiful, one would think that the philosopher is feigning his belief in the beauty of the painting. Conversely, the judgment of a philosopher who does not personally experience the goodness or truthfulness of an object he determines as good or true would not be treated as internally contradictory. The nature of beauty seems to be tied up with experience rather than passive philosophizing. This suggests a crucial fact: beauty is not ontological in nature, but phenomenological. Beauty cannot be observed or constructed independent of experience because beauty fundamentally is an experience. 

Beauty and its relation to truth

If beauty is not an ontological “object” alongside truth and goodness but is rather an experience, then the question is “of what is beauty the experience?” In order to answer this question, the accidental and essential features of beauty must be identified so that the true essence of beauty can be isolated. Take, for example, the painting La Primavera by Renaissance painter Sandro Botticelli as the object of analysis. If an observer were to know nothing about the symbolism and intricacy of the painting’s content, he would most likely not find it very beautiful. At most, the colors and form of the art style may elicit interest, but nothing more. However, as the observer learns more about the meaning of the painting, it will gradually exhibit more beauty. The discovery of its history as a gift for a married couple,^[4]Frank Zöllner, Botticelli: Images of Love And Spring (Munich: Prestel, 1998), 34 its intricately detailed floral landscape as signifying marriage and chastity,^[5]Umberto Baldini, Primavera: the Restoration of Botticelli’s Masterpiece (New York: H.N. Abrams, 1986), 104 and the symbolism of the characters as icons of virtuous love and divine contemplation^[6]Zöllner, Botticelli: Images of Love And Spring, 92 will undoubtedly generate feelings of beauty. However, the explanation for this development is not immediately evident: what about this newfound information engenders the impression of beauty? One might argue that it is the consistency of the story within the painting that explains the observer’s feeling of beauty.  This currently tenuous connection can be explicated by analyzing another, more universally understood vehicle of beauty: sunsets. The question of why sunsets are experienced as beautiful is a broad one, but the conditions which explain the beauty of sunsets can be identified by examining which features of a sunset are integral to its beauty. For example, if the colors of a sunset were not yellow and orange but purple and blue, it would still retain much of its beauty. This suggests, then, that the specific color palette of a sunset is not the main determinant of its beauty. Likewise, the shapes of the clouds and sun do not seem to be central contributors to the beauty of a sunset because the altering of their shapes would not eliminate such beauty. Conversely, if the magnitude of a sunset were reduced, it would lose almost the entirety of its beauty. The feeling of the expansiveness of nature while watching a sunset is essential to experiencing it as beautiful; the observer senses a “holy silence”^[7]Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (Northfield: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 18 that only accompanies an interaction with majesty that is significantly larger than oneself. In the face of this majesty, one feels both reduced to minuteness by the immense expansiveness and feels elevated to greatness by the grandiosity which floods the senses. The reason for the experience of beauty in a sunset, then, is the sheer magnitude of the object in relation to the subject.  However, the explanation for beauty in this instance is completely unrelated to the explanation for beauty in La Primavera. Whereas the former is centered on the scope of nature, the latter draws on the internal consistency of a story. If one feels beauty in encountering both sunsets and La Primavera, and the explanations for beauty in each instance are different from one another, then what is the explanation for the common experience of beauty? In order to arrive at a singular account of the nature of beauty as experience, one must provide an underlying source for the seemingly different experiences of beauty from sunsets and La Primavera. When examining the premonitions of beauty in both encounters, there seems to be a common source of beauty which is more fundamental than the aforementioned sources particular to each encounter: a confrontation with “truth.” When an observer learns about La Primavera, he is confronting a truth about the intricate artistic form and consistent philosophical content of the painting. When an observer witnesses a sunset, he is confronting a truth about the grandeur of nature. Thus, although magnitude and internal consistency may be an immediate explanation for beauty in sunsets and La Primavera, these precepts elicit feelings of beauty specifically because they are truths about nature and art which are being confronted. In other words, these encounters with reality as such are what generate the impressions of beauty. Therefore, beauty can be defined not as an ontological transcendental alongside truth, but as the experience of truth. This means that underlying every premonition of beauty is an encounter with a fundamental truth, one that may not be immediately apparent but exists nonetheless. 

The metaphysical structure of beauty

This conceptual shift away from beauty as an independent ontological feature toward beauty as an experience of truth has major implications on the theorized structure of beauty. Given this phenomenological definition of beauty, the philosophy of beauty ought not to focus on “properties” of beauty (i.e. Aristotle’s order, symmetry, and definiteness), but on the metaphysical structure of beauty as experience of truth. Thus, one way to understand beauty to a greater extent is to understand the ways it conveys different levels of truth. There are three types of truth that can be filtered out from experiences of beauty: particular truths, universal truths, and existential truths.  Particular truths are truths specific to the object, and since their discovery requires only perception, they are the most evidently obvious truths. Using sunsets as an example again, a particular truth which can be derived from the impression of beauty is “Sunsets mimic art in its form and content.” Universal truths are generalizable to existence itself and, because such extrapolation requires the use of the intellect, they require more intellectual effort to identify. A universal truth derived from the experience of sunsets is “Nature is sublimely grandiose compared to man.” Finally, existential truths are specific to the subject and are concerned with the telos of the subject. Rather than providing information about the object as with particular truths or general concepts related to the object as with universal truths, existential truths reveal the motivations, desires, and priorities of the subject. However, discovering existential truths requires self-authenticity, and given the difficulty of minimizing bias in an examination of oneself, these truths are the most difficult to illuminate. An example of an existential truth in relation to experiencing sunsets is “I desire to immerse myself in majesty rather than to assert myself as the center of reality.” Through this metaphysical framework of the truth-beauty relation, it becomes clear that every experience of beauty is worthy of reflection and meditation. This practical implication, however, will be discussed in greater detail later.  

The ubiquity and intensity of beauty

Nonetheless, there is still a major concern about the validity of this framework: if there are different forms of truth underlying every premonition of beauty, one might wonder why people do not find beauty in every aspect of reality. Why does man not experience beauty in witnessing the pebble in the pond or the grasshopper in the grass or the car on the road? Is man not encountering a “truth” insofar as he is confronting reality as such? The simple response to this is that man can and should find beauty in even these mundane details. Similar to how man experiences beauty by grasping the truth of his finitude in the face of nature’s grandeur, man ought to also experience beauty by grasping the truth of his existence in materiality. Even the slightest gust of wind communicates a profound existential truth that is capable of generating sublime beauty: “I exist, and I am immersed in experience.” In other words, every aspect of reality can elicit beauty because there is a truth which can be derived from everything; if there is no interpretive philosophical truth which can be extrapolated from an object, then its sheer facticity can be treated as a most basic truth from which to experience beauty.  That being said, it also seems that every experience of beauty is not equally powerful. If beauty is the experience of truth, then a more grandiose truth will generate a more intense beauty. This grandiosity does not need to be grounded in physical size, but is more related to the conceptual scope of the truth at hand. Therefore, since there are some truths which are more grandiose than others, there will be experiences of beauty which are more intense than others. For example, the existence of a boulder is a “truth” insofar as it really exists. As mentioned previously, one can find beauty in beholding this boulder’s facticity because it relates the truth of material existence on a small scale. On the other hand, the existence of love between spouses generates a more intense experience of beauty because the philosophical truths which underlie love (i.e. the exercise of self-sacrifice as conducive to human flourishing, the mutual pursuit of virtue as a unifying bond, etc.) are more grandiose than the factical truth which underlies the boulder’s existence. Therefore, although beauty can be found in everything because specific truths can be found in everything, there is a hierarchy for the intensity of beauty due to the hierarchy for the grandiosity of truth.

The illusory objective-subjective distinction

This framework of the hierarchy of beauty and truth naturally leads to another contentious area of discussion: the debate over the objectivity of beauty. This topic is fundamentally altered by the replacement of ontological beauty with phenomenological beauty because the terms “objective” and “subjective” are no longer even relevant to the phenomena of beauty. In order to outline why this is the case, it is necessary to revisit some concepts referenced in the beginning of the paper. The disagreement regarding the objectivity of beauty is centered around whether beauty exists as a property of objects or as a property of the mind. An objectivist like Aristotle would argue that beauty is a feature of the external world which can be identified and observed, regardless of the personal opinion surrounding what constitutes “the beautiful.” Conversely, a subjectivist like Hume would contend that beauty is a feature of individual perception, meaning the concept of “beauty” is subjectively constructed by observers. Both of these perspectives, however, presuppose that beauty is an ontological phenomena, meaning it is an “object” in reality that is either identified or constructed. The endeavor of this paper, however, is to demonstrate that this presupposition is erroneous and that beauty ought to be defined in phenomenological terms. Thus, if beauty truly is an experience rather than an object, then it is neither objective or subjective. Experiences are not identified or constructed as objects in reality; they are felt, encountered, sustained. Therefore, there can be no objective beauty because it is not a property that belongs to the external world. There can be no subjective beauty because it is not a concept constructed by the individual intellect.  As such, the question of “Is beauty an objective property of external reality” must be reconfigured in phenomenological terms. The new question, then, is this: “Is there an objectively greatest experience of beauty which can be attained?” This question is immensely important because if there is an objectively greatest ideal for feeling beauty, then every regular premonition of beauty is an approximation of that ideal. This means that in pursuing greater beauty, man will not exhaust himself by naively attempting to grasp some absolute that does not exist, but is actually stepping closer to experiencing Beauty itself.  In order to assess whether there exists an objectively greatest experience of beauty, a previously mentioned principle must be revisited: a more grandiose truth will generate a more intense beauty. The most grandiose truth is Truth itself: all that was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be. The Truth is the totality of all that is, the icon of reality as such. Therefore, if beauty is the experience of truth, then the most intense Beauty is to grasp Truth itself, to conceptualize all of existence. Philosophically, this is why man strives after wisdom. It is to grasp the Truth, because in doing so, we step closer to the experience of Beauty. Theologically, this is why man hopes in God. Recognizing his inability to grasp Truth entirely, man seeks the Divine: since God is Truth, the Beatific Vision is Beauty. Thus, in contemplating the embodiment of Truth itself in the Divine Essence, man is preparing himself for the experience of Beauty itself. Therefore, the objectively greatest experience of beauty is found in the Divine.

The Christology of the truth-beauty relation

This theological principle is made most clear in the person of Christ. As the ontologically simple^[8]C.f. The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ (Second and Revised Edition, 1920), I.3, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, he is Truth: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life.”^[9]John 14:6, Holy Bible, English Standard Version. Crossway, 2016 As the mediator between divinity and humanity,^[10]1 Timothy 2:5, Holy Bible, ESV the participation in the Body of Christ enables man to “partake in the divine nature.”^[11]2 Peter 1:4, Holy Bible, ESV This is exemplified in the Transfiguration, where Christ revealed a glimpse of his Beauty to the select disciples: “And he was transfigured before them, and his face shone like the sun, and his clothes became white as light.”^[12]Matthew 17:2, Holy Bible, ESV Thus, in the Christian tradition, Christ is both the embodiment of Truth, meaning he is the gateway to the experience of Beauty.

Implications of the reevaluation of beauty

In addition to providing a metaphysical account of beauty with high explanatory power for all its artistic and aesthetic forms, the reevaluation of beauty as the experience of truth has other important implications.  Existentially, it means that every individual’s experience of beauty has an underlying truth motivating it. Consequently, every person should meditate on their experience of beauty in order to filter out the truths which define their existence. This is especially true with existential truths; these truths are often elusive and access to them is inhibited by personal bias or anxiety. In the premonition of beauty, though, these existential truths can be isolated and identified so that each person may understand themselves to a greater extent. Likewise, every truth can be experienced as beautiful. As mentioned previously, even the truth of factical existence can be cherished as long as one makes the effort to truly experience these truths. Rather than solely observing reality around oneself, each person can feel beauty by contemplating a simple maxim: that they and other objects exist rather than not. By meditating on this simple truth, one can learn to experience life rather than passively move through it, thereby enabling access to the profound beauty of existence itself. Philosophically and pedagogically, the philosophical reevaluation of beauty provides an impetus for pursuing wisdom and a framework for communicating that wisdom. In an age of relativism and industrialization, much of modern society has deemed the concept of pursuing truth in philosophy and the humanities as anachronistic or useless. However, beauty is something that almost every person desires because, by virtue of its nature as personal experience, it is much more visceral, concrete, and accessible than truth. Consequently, since beauty is the experience of truth, philosophers can promote the pursuit of truth by describing the experience of the pursuit as feeling beauty. As Whitehead observes, “From these functions of Truth in the service of Beauty, the realization of Truth becomes in itself an element promoting Beauty of feeling.”^[13]Whitehead, Adventures, 267 Thus, in order to properly convey the fullness of truth in any respect, the beauty defining the experience of that truth must be communicated. For example, when teaching history, the brute facts and evidence cannot be the only information conveyed to students. Rather, part of the curriculum must seek to inculcate the experience of grasping history in its totality. If a teacher wishes to convey the cyclical nature of history, he should help students feel the experiential bond that they share with the ancients. In doing so, he is conveying the beauty of history as the experience of historical truths. If the beauty is inculcated effectively, then the students will begin to crave the truth that underlies their experience of this beauty.  Given these potential implications of conceptualizing beauty as the experience of truth, there is hope for modernity. Despite the disillusionment of modern society from metaphysics and transcendentals, the simple experience of beauty has the capacity to orient mankind back towards pursuit of the truth. The truth may no longer convict the modern mind, but the allure of beauty can revive the modern heart. Thus, the modern man must meditate on truth, beauty, and their relation in order to rediscover the fullness of life in the modern world. As Dostoevsky prophesied, “Beauty will save the world.”^[14]Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot (1869), 561